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Abstract 
This study explores the geographic dependencies of echo-chamber communication on Twitter 
during the Brexit referendum campaign. We review the literature on filter bubbles, echo 
chambers, and polarization to test five hypotheses positing that echo-chamber communication is 
associated with homophily in the physical world, chiefly the geographic proximity between users 
advocating sides of the campaign. The results support the hypothesis that echo chambers in the 
Leave campaign are associated with geographic propinquity, whereas in the Remain campaign 
the reverse relationship was found. This study presents evidence that geographically proximate 
social enclaves interact with polarized political discussion where echo-chamber communication 
is observed. The article concludes with a discussion of these findings and the contribution to 
research on filter bubbles and echo chambers. 
 
 
Introduction 
Literature on online social networks defines echo chambers as a process of self-selection in 
which communication is circumscribed to ideologically-aligned cliques (Del Vicario et al., 2016; 
Del Vicario, Zollo, Caldarelli, Scala, & Quattrociocchi, 2017; Zollo et al., 2017). The political 
communication literature has explored the potential of echo chambers to foreclose deliberation 
by reinforcing the political views and preferences of individuals (Colleoni, Rozza, & Arvidsson, 
2014; Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009), a development largely seen as a problematic for democracy in 
as far as it engenders political polarization (Sunstein, 2007). Echo chambers are deeply 
embedded in processes of political polarization, selective exposure, and “filter bubbles,” but 
research exploring the structural equivalence (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) of actors involved in 
 
	
echo-chamber communication remains largely uncharted (Barberá, Jost, Nagler, Tucker, & 
Bonneau, 2015). 
While exact equivalence is rarely observed in real-world social networks, structural, 
isomorphic, and regular equivalence are measures of network similarity and equivalence that can 
help identifying classes or clusters of users (Freeman, 2011). Transposed to the network of 
tweets about the U.K. E.U. membership referendum, we seek to explore whether users engaging 
in echo-chamber communication are clustered in subgraphs that are homogeneous with regard to 
sociodemographic variables such as household and employment. More specifically, we consider 
whether geography and class are variables that interact with echo-chamber communication, a 
proposition in line with the principle of homophily asserting that individuals are more likely to 
associate and form ties with similar others. Isomorphic dependencies affecting homophily 
include a range of factors such as age, gender, class, and organizational role (Scott & Carrington, 
2011), but for the purposes of this study we sought to extensively probe the relationship between 
geography and echo chambers. 
 Homophily thus offers a framework for understanding isomorphic dependencies that 
might interact with echo chamber communication. Firstly, echo chambers censor, disallow, or 
underrepresent competing views by enforcing social homogeneity much in line with the 
bandwagon effect predicted by the homophily model (Mark, 2003). Secondly, cultural 
similarities and differences among people can be formalized as a function of geographic 
propinquity (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Thirdly, online social networks are more 
prone to homophily compared with offline networks, which are tied to physical locations where 
serendipitous exposure to social diversity is more likely to happen (Hampton & Gupta, 2008; 
Hampton, Livio, & Goulet, 2010). In view of that, we seek to advance cognate scholarship with 
an investigation into whether echo-chamber communication is associated with geographical 
proximity between users that tweeted the U.K. E.U. membership referendum or the “Brexit 
campaign.” 
The Brexit referendum campaign was held at a time of sharp polarization among the 
electorate on the cultural and economic costs or, alternatively, the benefits of E.U. membership 
(Kriesi & Frey, 2008). While older and culturally conservative voters protested the infringement 
on national sovereignty by European institutions, in addition to being concerned about the impact 
of E.U. workforce mobility on British society, a more liberal-minded electorate welcomed the 
 
	
collective decision-making at the heart of the European Union and accepted the inward E.U. 
migration into the U.K. as a source of greater diversity (Curtice, 2016). In the run-up to the 
referendum, the winning campaign to leave the Union foregrounded a culturally conservative 
message centered on the proposition to ‘take back control’ from the E.U. by reasserting the 
sovereignty of the British Parliament and courts of justice and curtailing the free movement of 
E.U. labor (Leave, 2016; Leave.EU, 2016). The vote to leave the E.U. further exposed a 
geographical splintering of the country. The metropolitan area of London, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland voted to remain while the rest of England as well as Wales voted to leave (Rennie Short, 
2016).  
In what follows, we review the literature on political polarization and online echo 
chambers, chiefly diagnosed as a phenomenon further fragmenting the electorate in liberal 
democracies. We propose several hypotheses designed to advance the analysis of echo chambers 
by emphasizing their relationship to physical distance. Our results move forward this scholarship 
by foregrounding the geographical dependencies of Twitter echo chambers.  
 
Previous Work 
Polarization is a malaise of democratic politics proliferating through negative campaigning 
predicated on the partisan articulation of dismissive out-group stereotypes (Iyengar, Sood, & 
Lelkes, 2012). The factors driving political polarization have been thoroughly documented in the 
literature on information diffusion and they partially overlap with the factors driving homophily 
(Moody & Mucha, 2013). These factors include the tendency to expose oneself to consonant 
content that reinforces predispositions, particularly one’s pre-existing political views (Iyengar & 
Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2008, p. 360). Polarization also pertains to a pattern of association into 
opinion or attitude-based groups through a process of separation by disagreement (Baldassarri & 
Gelman, 2008; DiMaggio, Evans, & Bryson, 1996). As the distance between people’s opinions 
widens, they become less likely to influence each other and more susceptible to clustering 
together in isolated groupings (Bessi et al., 2015). As polarization rises, cooperation to reach 
cross-ideological and agreeable outcomes becomes increasingly less likely (Andris et al., 2015). 
The metaphor of echo chambers was traditionally used to caution against the rhetoric 
exalting the greater diversity and pluralism of the internet (Sunstein, 2007). The distributed 
infrastructure of the internet—spanning divisions of time and space (Castells, 2009)—was 
 
	
envisioned as enabling horizontal, networked congregation around mutual interests or practices 
that bypassed traditional intermediaries in modern democratic societies. The circumvention of 
intermediaries was, in the eyes of some observers, a threat to society as it removed a common 
framework for social experience (Sunstein, 2007). This latter set of concerns has however 
misrepresented the role of online interactions in the information flow from news-makers to 
audiences, particularly the homogenizing effect of inter-personal relationships on the opinions 
and actions of individuals. Likewise, it fails to take account of the evidence that the media have 
embraced and amplified negative campaigning by political candidates (Castells, 2009; Iyengar, 
et al., 2012).  
Notwithstanding, the individual seemingly became at once embedded in multiple, 
personal and diverse social networks thanks to the usage of internet technologies (Rainie & 
Wellman, 2012, p. 7). This networked individual supposedly substituted membership in dense 
social groups that are strongly tied to one’s physical location―e.g., of one’s home, 
neighborhood, or workplace—with immersion into geographically dispersed online networks of 
shared interest, practice, or outlook (Rainie & Wellman, 2012; Sunstein, 2007; Wojcieszak & 
Mutz, 2009). This levelling of geographical distance did not prevent individuals from grouping 
with similar others online (McPherson, et al., 2001), but the relationship between spatial distance 
and users’ interaction in social media has been found to be significant, with friendship ties in 
densely connected groups arising at shorter spatial distances compared with social ties between 
members of different groups (Laniado, Volkovich, Scellato, Mascolo, & Kaltenbrunner, 2017). 
More importantly, research found social ties on Twitter to be constrained by geographical 
distance with an over-representation of ties confined to distances shorter than 100 kilometers 
(Takhteyev, Gruzd, & Wellman, 2012).  
If anything, networked individualism complicated social interaction in two notable ways. 
First, the use specifically of social media was shown to be coextensive with larger and more 
diverse personal networks likely to include a discussion confidant from a different political party 
(Hampton, Sessions, & Her, 2011). Hampton, et al. (2010) suggested that a pervasive awareness 
of one’s own network resulted from social networking sites making one’s own ego networks 
publicly visible. Subsequently, the commercial services underpinning social media platforms 
deployed algorithms designed to quantify and monetize social interaction (Dijck, 2013), 
 
	
narrowly confining it to a filter bubble algorithmically populated with information closely 
matching observed and expressed user preferences (Pariser, 2012, p. 11).  
More than a decade of research into echo chambers, however, suggests that the use of 
internet technologies was not an immediate cause of selective exposure or ideological 
polarization, the latter previously appearing as more pronounced in face-to-face interactions 
(Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2011). Notably, Horrigan, Garrett, and Resnick (2004, p. ii) found that 
“internet users are not insulating themselves in information echo chambers. Instead, they are 
exposed to more political arguments than non-users”. Users of algorithmically personalized 
filtering systems seemed similarly exposed to higher numbers of sources, channels and news 
categories (Beam & Kosicki, 2014). Indeed, exposure to diverse and even competing opinions on 
polarizing topics was found to occur on social media platforms across various national contexts 
(Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Kim, 2011). 
While researchers have not found filter bubbles to be associated with news readership, 
evidence of echo-chamber communication and filter bubbles was found in other settings, with 
representative surveys identifying social media users who actively seek the company of people 
with whom they tend to agree (Vaccari et al., 2016). Notwithstanding the rapid expansion of 
online social networks, and the attendant expectation of higher exposure to a variety of news and 
politically diverse information (Messing & Westwood, 2014, p. 1056), online social networks 
also increased the appetite for selective exposure in highly polarized social environments 
(Wojcieszak, 2010), with the sharing of controversial news items being particularly unlikely to 
take place in these contexts (Bright, 2016). Even with scanty evidence linking filter bubbles and 
echo chambers to general social media communication, researchers have found evidence of 
echo-chamber communication in polarized contexts and balkanized media landscapes (Barberá, 
et al., 2015; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Stroud, 2008; Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). 
Barberá, et al. (2015) emphasized that political information was more likely to be 
retweeted if received from ideologically similar sources, a finding that lends support to the 
selective exposure hypothesis. Song and Boomgaarden (2017) explored selective exposure 
resulting from the choice of information sources being aligned with political preferences. 
Himelboim, McCreery, and Smith (2013) reported that cross-ideological information on Twitter 
was unlikely to be circulated in social clusters with a strong group identity. These results speak 
to early research on selective exposure on social media that found politically conservative users 
 
	
to be more likely than liberals to confine their communication of political issues to ideological 
echo chambers on blogs (Adamic & Glance, 2005), Twitter (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Barberá, 
et al., 2015; Hayat & Samuel-Azran, 2017) and Facebook (Mitchell & Weisel, 2014).  
Inversely, liberals have tended to engage in cross-ideological retweeting more 
systematically than conservatives (Barberá, et al., 2015) while clustering around partisan 
information sources is more prevalent among conservative than liberal voters (Benkler, Faris, 
Roberts, & Zuckerman, 2017). The use of “moral-emotional language” on Twitter was found to 
be associated with polarization and to lead to echo chambers (Brady, Wills, Jost, Tucker, & Van 
Bavel, 2017) while @-mentioning was found to be associated with higher degrees of cross-
ideological interactions (Conover et al., 2011), likely as a strategy to tinge rival political content 
with partisan messages. In the last instance, however, bridging echo chambers is a cost-intensive 
activity that requires engaging in a combative discussion and disputing competing claims (Bessi, 
et al., 2015; Bessi et al., 2016).  
 
Hypotheses 
Taking these considerations into account, we expect echo-chamber communication to be 
prevalent in the referendum campaign (H1)―i.e., that users identified with one side of the 
campaign will be more likely to engage with like-minded users. We refer to this pattern of echo 
chamber in which both sender and receiver are tweeting the same campaign as in-bubble 
interactions and we test this hypothesis for the Leave (H1a) and the Remain (H1b) campaigns. In 
view of the homophily dependencies reviewed hitherto, particularly the association between 
selective exposure and social enclaves (social groupings with specific interests within larger 
groups), we also expect echo-chamber communication to be at least partially mirrored by 
geographic proximity. Therefore, we hypothesize that echo chambers are to be found 
predominantly in geographically proximate in-bubbles both in the Leave (H2a) and the Remain 
(H2b) campaigns. We refer to this geographically-bounded self-selection as neighboring in-
bubble communication in opposition to cross-bubble, when users interact with the other side of 
the campaign, and out-bubble, when users interact with a neutral user.  
Thirdly, we take stock of the geographic factor possibly driving echo chambers and 
hypothesize that in-bubbles will cover shorter geographic distances compared with out- and 
cross-bubbles, both in the Leave (H3a) and Remain (H3b) campaigns. Hypotheses H2 and H3 
 
	
are thus intrinsically connected: while the former explores whether geographically-proximate 
echo chambers are prevalent, the latter (H3) probes whether echo-chamber communication is 
more likely to cover short geographic distances. Testing these hypotheses allows us to 
subsequently probe whether Leave interactions are more likely to be neighboring in-bubbles 
compared with Remain interactions (H4). Lastly, and most importantly for the aims of this study, 
we postulated that echo-chamber communication (in-bubble) is associated with the geographic 
distance covered by messages in the Leave (H5a) and Remain (H5b) campaigns. In summary, we 
proceed from a relatively simple hypothesis of whether echo-chamber communication occurred 
in the Brexit debate on Twitter towards the last hypothesis testing the geographic dependencies 
of echo chambers. As such, the five main hypotheses to be tested in this study are the following: 
 
H1a.  Users tweeting the Leave campaign interact predominantly with other users tweeting the 
Leave campaign (echo chambers within the Leave campaign) 
H1b.  Users tweeting the Remain campaign interact predominantly with other users tweeting 
the Remain campaign (echo chambers within the Remain campaign) 
H2a.  Leave interactions are predominantly within geographically proximate echo chambers 
(neighboring in-bubble) 
H2b. Remain interactions are predominantly within geographically proximate echo chambers 
(neighboring in-bubble) 
H3a.  Leave echo chambers cover shorter geographic distances compared with non-bubbles 
H3b.  Remain echo chambers cover shorter geographic distances compared with non-bubbles 
H4. Leave interactions are more likely to be neighboring in-bubbles compared with Remain 
interactions 
H5a.  Echo-chamber communication in the Leave campaign is associated with geographic 
distance 
H5b.  Echo-chamber communication in the Remain campaign is associated with geographic 
distance 
 
Data and Methods 
For the purposes of this project we relied on Twitter Streaming and REST APIs to collect a total 
of 5,099,180 tweets using a set of keywords and hashtags, including relatively neutral tags such 
 
	
as referendum, inorout, and euref, but more importantly, messages that used hashtags clearly 
aligned with the Leave campaign: voteleave, leaveeu, takecontrol, no2eu, betteroffout, voteout, 
britainout, beleave, iwantout, and loveeuropeleaveeu; and hashtags clearly aligned with the 
Remain campaign: strongerin, leadnotleave, votein, voteremain, moreincommon, yes2eu, 
yestoeu, betteroffin, ukineu, and lovenotleave. The campaign-aligned, hashtag-based datasets are 
leveraged to identify messages advocating each side of the referendum: the Vote Leave or Vote 
Remain campaign. We subsequently removed messages tweeted before 15 April 2016, the 
starting date of the official campaign period, and after 24 June 2016, the end of the referendum 
campaign. 
Next we identify the location of users in our dataset by triangulating information from 
geocoded tweets (subsequently reverse-geocoded), locations identified in their user profile (then 
geocoded), and information that appeared in their tweets. The triangulation prioritizes the signal 
with higher precision, hence geocoded information is preferred if present. When not available, 
we look at the location field in users’ profiles and geocode that location. If neither source of 
information is available, we check for information in their tweets, but only in cases where the 
place_id field of the API response returns relevant information. As a result, a considerable 
portion of user locations in our dataset could be identified only to city or postcode level. Upon 
identifying the location of users, we remove users located outside the United Kingdom or whose 
location we could not identify up to postcode level. This reduces our dataset to 565,028 
messages or 11% of all collected messages; a sample of messages that is sufficiently large to 
allow for exploring the geographic dispersion of Vote Leave and Vote Remain Campaigns. 
For each tweet, we count the number of hashtags advocating the Leave and Remain 
campaigns. We tag the message as Remainer or Leaver on the basis of the highest number of 
hashtags used. Messages without hashtags advocating either side of the campaign are tagged as 
Neutral. This information, once aggregated, is also used to identify the affiliation of users that 
tweeted or retweeted politically polarized hashtags. Highly polarized messages―i.e., tweets 
including several one-sided hashtags, are however uncommon. For users championing the Vote 
Leave campaign, only 16% of their messages included more than one one-sided hashtag. These 
messages are yet more uncommon in the vote Remain campaign, where only 2% of messages 
included more than one hashtag clearly associated with that side of the campaign. 
 
	
We subsequently identify the campaign affiliation (Leave or Remain) of users @-
mentioned or retweeted in the original tweet. To achieve this, we loop through the dataset to find 
messages tweeted by these recipients that championed either side of the campaign. We calculate 
the mode or “mean affiliation” per user based on the frequency of one-sided hashtags used 
throughout the period. The mean affiliation per user can only be calculated for users that actively 
participated in the referendum campaign on Twitter. In other words, for users at the receiving 
end (@-mentioned or retweeted) to be identified as Leaver or Remainer, the user in question 
must have tweeted or retweeted a separate tweet with hashtags clearly aligned with one side of 
the campaign, whereas users that tweeted equal number of Remain and Leave hashtags are 
tagged as neutral. The rationale for restricting the parameters of ideological identification 
between users was to avoid mainstream media and high-profile accounts, which are regularly @-
mentioned or whose tweets are retweeted with the addition of one-sided hashtags, to be classified 
in either side of the campaign battle. The mean affiliation has the added benefit of filtering out 
retweets or @-mentions intended as provocation or ironic remark; these messages are offset by 
the broader ideological orientation tweeted by the account, and users that have only sourced 
information or received @-mentions are classified as neutral for not having themselves tweeted 
any partisan hashtag. 
In short, we opted for a more conservative approach to identifying campaign affiliation at 
the receiving end of a tweet so that users are only associated with one side of the campaign if the 
user herself tweeted a partisan message at some point during the campaign. We believe this 
approach grounded on the mean affiliation per user reflects strong campaign membership with 
low probability of false-positives, but these conservative parameters to identifying campaign 
affiliation further reduced our dataset to 33,889 tweets. The multiple sampling of the data 
(timespan, geographic location, campaign affiliation of sender and receiver) rendered a dataset 
that is both easy to process and highly curated by geographically enriched data. Given the 
rationale of this project, we believe this dataset offers a defensible if limited representation of the 
debate and our conclusions are conditional on these constraints. 
Echo chambers are defined as a function of the identified campaign affiliation. We tag 
each tweet as in-bubble if sender and receiver (@-mentioned or retweeted) have tweeted the 
same campaign. We tag it as cross-bubble if the sender has tweeted one campaign and the 
receiver (@-mentioned or retweeted) has tweeted the opposite campaign. We tag the tweet as 
 
	
out-bubble if either sender or receiver was classified as neutral, which simply means any of them 
have not tweeted any message with clearly supportive campaign hashtags. We further identified 
237 users with suspicious bot activity, but whose echo chamber activity comprised of only 63 
messages. To control for potential issues associated with bot activity, we replicated the analysis 
without this group of users, but no difference was found in the results. 
With the location of users defined using the abovementioned triangulation approach, we 
leverage the longitude and latitude values to calculate the Euclidean distance (in kilometers) 
covered by the sender and receiver of @-messages and retweets. We use the canonical mean 
equatorial radius (6378.145 km or 2.092567257E7 ft.) for earth radius. As such, our calculation 
is not mathematically precise due to the inaccurate estimate of the earth’s radius (R). Despite this 
perennial limitation, we believe the calculation is adequate as mathematical precision is of lesser 
importance when analyzing data whose geographic accuracy is limited to postcode level. We 
repeat the process for each tweet, thus identifying the account being @-mentioned or retweeted 
and calculating the distance (in kilometers) between sender and receiver.  
Finally, these differences are analyzed with a series of statistical tests, including linear 
regression, Chi-square, and Kolmogorov–Smirnov. For the Chi-squared tests, we reject the null 
hypothesis of the independence assumption if the p-value of 𝑥" = $%,'	–	*%,' +*%,',,-  is less than the 
given significance level α. To test Hypotheses H5, we examine if the variables sender’s 
affiliation and receivers’ affiliation are independent and if the probability distribution of one 
variable is affected by the other. 
 
Results 
We evaluated H1 and H2 by testing whether the probability distribution of the sender’s and 
receiver’s affiliation are independent (i.e., one variable is not affected by the presence of 
another). The variables are significantly correlated (r=.66, p<.0001) with a Chi-squared value of 
9646.4 (p< 2.2e-16). As a result, we conclude that the two variables are in fact dependent. We 
further explored H1a and rejected the null hypothesis of the independence assumption at the 95% 
confidence level, as users tweeting the Leave campaign are significantly more likely to interact 
with users also tweeting highly partisan Leave hashtags. In fact, only 9% of messages tweeted by 
users affiliated with the Leave campaign were directed to users associated with the Remain 
 
	
campaign (cross-bubble communication). This contrasted with 22% of interactions directed to 
neutral users (out-bubble communication) and a towering 69% of Leave @-messages and 
retweets being sourced from or directed to another user affiliated with the Leave campaign (in-
bubble communication), with little to no difference between @-mentions and retweets.  
The intensity of echo-chamber communication is remarkably similar on the Remain side 
of the campaign (H1b), where only 10% of users directed @-mentions or retweeted content from 
users identified with the Leave campaign (cross-bubble communication), with 22% of 
interactions including neutral users (out-bubble communication), and a total of 68% of 
interactions initiated by Remainers being echo chambers (in-bubble communication). The 
likelihood of users campaigning for one side of the referendum engaging with users of the same 
leaning―instead of neutral or adversarial users―was captured by fitting a linear regression 
model on the sender’s affiliation as the explanatory variable of echo-chamber communication: 
partisan affiliation explains nearly half of the variance in the data (R2adj=.44, p<2.2e-16). Figure 
1 unpacks these findings and shows the prevailing patterns of echo-chamber communication 
compared with out-bubble and cross-bubble communication (complementarity), both in the 
Leave and the Remain campaign, across a range of distance radiuses. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
We approached H2 by examining whether Leave and Remain interactions are predominantly 
within neighboring in-bubbles or geographically proximate echo chambers―i.e., within a 50 
kilometers radius expanded in 50 kilometers increments up to 900 kilometers, which is the 
maximum straight-line distance between two geographical points in the United Kingdom (from 
Land’s End to John o’ Groats). We found that most interactions are within a 200km radius, but 
the geographic trend is different between the Leave and Remain campaigns. As shown in Figure 
1a, the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of in-bubble Leave messages covers shorter 
distances compared to non-bubbles (i.e., out- and cross-bubble), with half of in-bubble messages 
covering less than 200 kilometers. The trend is reversed on the Remain side of the campaign, in 
which in-bubble interactions cover longer distances compared to non-bubble messages.  
Figure 1b also shows that Leave-campaign messages are chiefly exchanged within 
ideologically and geographically proximate echo chambers, a component of echo-chamber 
 
	
communication behavior that we further uncover in the following analyses. There is also 
relatively little cross-ideological retweeting and @-mentioning, much in line with previous 
findings reported in the literature (Himelboim, et al., 2013). The trend is however inversed on the 
Remain side of the campaign: as distance between sender and receiver increases, in-bubble 
communication becomes more common and covers increasingly larger geographic areas 
compared to out- and cross-bubble interactions. This reversed trend depicted in the CDF plot is 
also captured by the mean distance covered by Leave messages, at 199km for in-bubble and 
234km for non-bubble (𝑥=168 and 𝑥=208, respectively). For Remain messages, contrariwise, the 
mean distance is 238km for in-bubble and 204km for non-bubble (𝑥=209 and 𝑥=184, 
respectively). 
This is consistent with Hypothesis H2a and H2b, which state that Leave and Remain 
interactions, respectively, are predominantly within neighboring in-bubbles. Figure 2 shows this 
relationship by contrasting cross-, out-, and in-bubble communication across the United 
Kingdom (we found no difference in the communication patterns of @-mentions and retweets). 
The results lend support to H3a but reject hypothesis H3b, as only Leave echo chambers are 
likely to cover short geographic distances compared with non-bubbles. In fact, there are nearly 
three times as many in-bubble interactions in the Leave campaign for every cross-bubble and 
out-bubble communication combined, with the number of users involved in out-bubble 
communication being about half and one-fifth, respectively, of those involved in echo-chamber 
communication.  
Despite echo chambers on the Remain side being independent from geographic distance, 
there is a much higher ratio of interactions falling within in-bubble patterns. Similarly to the 
Leave campaign, there are three times as many in-bubble interactions for every out-bubble, and 
six times as many for every cross-bubble interaction. The number of Remain supporters involved 
in out-bubble communication is about two-thirds of those involved in in-bubble communication 
and only a third if we compare cross-bubble with in-bubble. However, while echo chambers in 
the Leave campaign appear constrained by short geographic distances (H3a), this is not the case 
on Remain side (H3b). In fact, Remain echo chambers are likely to span greater geographic 
distances while their cross-bubble communication is concentrated around neighboring 
communities. 
 
 
	
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
We approach H4, which hypothesizes that Leave interactions cover shorter geographic distances 
compared with Remain interactions, by calculating the average distance @-mentions and 
retweets travelled from source to destination for each side of the partisan divide. The results lend 
support to H4 as one-quarter of Leave interactions took place within 100 kilometers whereas 
fewer than one-fifth followed such pattern in the Remain campaign. The average distance 
covered by Leave partisan messages is also shorter at 178km compared with 199km for the 
Remain campaign. In-bubble communication in the Leave campaign covers a remarkably short 
geographic distance at only 22 kilometers compared to 40km for the Remain campaign, a pattern 
also observed in out-bubble and cross-bubble communication, where Leave messages cover 86 
and 197 kilometers compared with 103 and 243 for Remain messages, respectively. Figure 2 
unpacks these differences and shows the geographic clustering of Leave messages, particularly 
in-bubble interactions, centered in the Brexit heartland of the English Midlands, the North, and 
the East. 
We approach H5a, which hypothesizes that echo-chamber communication is associated 
with geographic proximity in the Leave and Remain campaigns (H5a and H5b, respectively), by 
comparing the density distribution curves of in-, out-, and cross-bubble communication 
subgraphs alongside the density curve of randomly-generated comparable subgraphs. To this 
end, we randomly swap the location of users in each subgraph (in-, out-, and cross-bubble), 
recalculate the distance travelled by @-mention and retweet messages, and compare the observed 
distribution of distances against the random distribution of distances travelled by each message. 
The rationale for this analysis is to identify distributions that deviate from the random 
reallocation of users across geographic locations while preserving individual social networks 
identified by their communications on Twitter as well as the geographic distribution of users in 
the country. We do not assign random locations to users; we simply swap the location of users in 
each subgraph to test if the distribution is similar to the random network which preserves the 
overall geographical distribution of users. This approach establishes an association between 
echo-chamber communication and the geography of message diffusion whenever the observed 
networks―ceteris paribus―differ significantly from the random network. In other words, for 
each iteration of the test we retain the set of locations in each subgraph, but randomly reorder the 
 
	
locations to test whether geographic dependencies found in echo-chamber communication are 
replicated in the randomized geographic network. 
We ran 100 iterations of each test and the results are shown in Figure 3: the high volume 
of interactions within geographically proximate echo chambers―i.e., within the 50 kilometers 
radius―is a considerable departure from the distribution in the randomized network. This 
deviation is particularly prominent in echo-chamber communication (i.e., in-bubble interactions). 
This pattern disappears when the location of users is randomly reshuffled, an indication that the 
distribution is not determined by chance. We can thus conclude that the geographic distribution 
of echo-chamber communication is unlikely, i.e., much less likely to happen than in the 
randomized null model. This unlikely distribution is yet more salient in the subgraph of Leave, 
in-bubble interactions and disappears in out- and cross-bubble interactions for the Leave 
campaign and again in the entire network of Remain interactions. In other words, the association 
between geographic proximity and echo-chamber communication is restricted to the Leave 
campaign and lends support to hypothesis H5a, while in the Remain campaign we observe no 
such dynamics and hence reject hypothesis H5b. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
To assess the significance of these results, we performed a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test on the 
probability distribution of distances covered by messages compared with the probability 
distribution of distances covered by messages with users’ locations randomly reshuffled. In other 
words, we swap the location of users in the graph and calculate the distances covered by their 
interactions again, thus providing a reference probability distribution to test the similitude of the 
two samples with a continuous distribution. Figure 3 shows the test statistic, the maximum 
distance between the ECDF of the two samples, and the p-value for each of the tests. The results 
are significant for all modalities of self-selected bubble and each side of the political divide, 
except for cross-bubble communication, which is not significant in any of the subgraphs, likely a 
result of the small sample size of cross-bubble communication as the distributions are similar 
with no superimposed oscillatory disturbances. 
The maximum distance (supremum) between the CDFs of the two samples is 
significantly higher for Leave in-bubble interactions, in which the peak amplitude deviates from 
 
	
the pattern observed for the rest of the network and during the random reshuffling of users’ 
locations. The probability of seeing a test statistic as high or higher than the one observed if the 
two samples were drawn from the same distribution is vanishingly small. The results thus 
support hypothesis H5a: echo-chamber communication in the Leave campaign is likely to be 
associated with geographic proximity, as in-bubble interactions in the Leave campaign show 
significantly more short distance activity than expected by chance (p<2.20E-16). Hypothesis 
H5b―that echo-chamber communication is associated with geographic proximity in the Remain 
campaign―is however rejected. Although the distribution of in-bubble data for the Remain 
campaign deviates significantly (p<1.56E-05) from the reference probability distribution 
(stochastic rearrangement of users’ locations), the effect is in effect inversed: echo-chamber 
communication in the Remain campaign is more likely to cover larger distances compared with 
out- and cross-bubble communication, which on average cover shorter geographic distances. 
In view of the high deviation from the probability distribution of users’ locations 
randomly reshuffled, we sought to further examine hypothesis H5 by probing variables that 
could have interfered with this distribution. We firstly speculated that highly-active, super-users 
in few cities could have drawn the geographic distribution of in-bubble communication in the 
Leave campaign. Secondly, we conjectured that isolated events such as the murder of the Labour 
Member of Parliament Jo Cox could have likewise skewed a distribution that would otherwise 
remain comparable to the remainder of the campaign data. However, we managed to rule out 
these effects by inspecting the probability distribution while controlling for these variables. To 
this end, we performed Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests on the observed subgraph of echo-chamber 
communication in the Leave campaign and the same subgraphs minus super-users (maximum 10 
tweets). The results rejected the hypothesis that the two distributions are significantly different at 
the 95% confidence interval and supports the assumption that the geographic patterning found in 
echo chambers is independent of super-users. 
 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
We addressed our second conjecture by slicing the 10-week period covered by the 
referendum campaign (14 April to 23 June) into four sub-periods comprising weeks 1-3, weeks 
4-6, weeks 7-8, and weeks 9-10 and performing Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests on each temporal 
 
	
scenario. The distribution appears to change over time, but the geographic patterning associated 
with echo chambers in the Leave campaign remains relatively robust throughout the period. 
Figure 4 shows the observed and random distribution for echo chambers in the referendum 
network and subgraphs of the Leave and Remain campaigns over the 10-week period. Weeks 1-3 
show a similar peak observed in the aggregate network, which decreases in the weeks 4-8, but 
surges again the last two weeks of the referendum, which concentrates most of the user activity 
in the period. It is interesting to note that in weeks 9-10, which is marked by the intense activity 
of Leave and Remain campaigners, the observed distribution is remarkably similar to the 
randomized signal at the network level, but the separate inspection of Leave and Remain 
subgraphs reveals striking interactions between online activity and geography. 
In summary, the weekly variations continued to present peak amplitudes that deviate 
from the rest of the network and from the distribution observed with the random reshuffling of 
users’ locations, with inverse geographic patterning of echo chambers for Leave and Remain 
campaigns, particularly in the weeks leading up to the vote. Therefore, we conclude that echo 
chambers in the Leave campaign are significantly associated with geographic propinquity and 
the results appear to be robust across classes of Twitter users and during different moments of 
the referendum campaign. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study presented the first evidence that geographically proximate social enclaves interact 
with polarized political discussions in which online echo-chamber communication is observed. 
The first hypothesis tested in this study is broadly consistent with previous results found in the 
literature (Del Vicario, et al., 2016; Zollo, et al., 2017). Del Vicario, et al. (2017) studied the 
Brexit debate on Facebook and reported significant evidence of echo chamber behavior. The 
finding that Remainers were more likely to engage in cross-bubble is also consistent with 
previous research that found liberals more likely to engage in cross-ideological retweeting than 
conservatives (Barberá & Rivero, 2015). While research on filter bubbles cautions against the 
inclination to identify filter bubbles with the medium of the internet (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017), 
literature exploring political polarization on social media posits a positive prospect of echo-
chamber communication being observed as the debate becomes more contentious (Barberá, et 
al., 2015). The results of hypothesis H1 are thus broadly consistent with previous research: the 
 
	
Brexit debate has accentuated the political divides among the British public along antagonistic 
fault lines. As such, it is unsurprising to have found Leave and Remain campaigns engaging in 
widespread echo chamber behavior. 
 It is the results of hypotheses H2-H5 that shed new light on the dynamics of echo-
chamber communication. By identifying a physical patterning in echo-chamber communication, 
at least in the Leave campaign, where in-bubble communication was remarkably restricted to 
physical communities proximate to each other, we have explored one isomorphic dependency 
underlying echo chambers―geographic propinquity―, but we nonetheless expect others to be at 
play, likely interacting with the geographic clustering in social and political enclaves that may 
have marked much of the Brexit debate. The findings also provide more granularity for future 
research exploring echo chambers: after extricating echo chambers from filter bubbles, we 
advance a geographical variable interacting with this pattern of communication that needs to be 
further investigated, if possible replicated, by future research. One compelling reason for 
replication is the notable claim that a tendency towards homophilic political clustering may be 
compounded by the geographic unboundedness of online communication (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 
2009). 
Hypothesis H2 offers the added benefit of working as a control mechanism. We 
previously established that echo-chamber communication was prevalent in the Brexit debate, and 
that in-bubble interactions were more likely to cover short geographic distances for the Leave 
campaign even after controlling for highly-active users and seasonal variations. Yet only by 
inspecting the entire network, along with out- and cross-bubble subgraphs, one could identify the 
geographic dependency as a development restricted to in-bubble, echo-chamber communication. 
We believe this is an important contribution to the debate on echo chambers, but further research 
is necessary to establish the magnitude of the effect and the underlying mechanisms through 
which physical proximity and political affinity translates into in-bubble, echo-chamber 
communication. We expect more intricate relationships between existing physical ties and online 
interactions to be at play (Laniado, et al., 2017; Takhteyev, et al., 2012), with the relationship 
between campaign affiliation and geographical propinquity capturing only secondary effects of 
this interaction. Ultimately, the results reported in this study are particularly puzzling when 
considering that the geographic embedding of online echo chambers was restricted to the Leave 
campaign. In sharp contrast, Remainers appear to have focused their cross-campaign efforts on 
 
	
neighboring areas of their community while their echo chambers aimed more distant, likely less 
tangible user accounts such as media outlets. 
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Figure 1: (a) Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of in-bubble (echo chambers) and non-
bubble (out- and cross-bubble) communication; and (b) Histogram of distance travelled by 
messages between sender and receiver in 50-kilometer bins 
  
 
	
	
Figure 2: (a) Geographic pattern of cross-bubble, out-bubble, and echo chambers (in-bubble) 
with number of vertices and edges in each subgraph and the average distance travelled between 
sender and receiver; and (b) snapshot of the central point of diffusion of the Leave campaign, 
geographically located in the English Midlands, the North, and the East. 
  
 
	
	
Figure 3: Distribution of distances covered by interactions across in-bubble, out-bubble, and 
cross-bubble for referendum network and subgraphs of the Leave and Remain campaigns, 
followed by the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test statistic and the p-value. The dotted line shows the 
reference probability distribution used to test the similitude of the two samples with a continuous 
distribution.	
  
 
	
	
Figure 4: Distribution of distances covered by echo-chamber communication (in-bubble) for the 
referendum network and subgraphs of the Leave and Remain campaigns over the 10-week 
referendum campaign (14 April to 23 June). The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test statistic and the p-
value indicate the differences in the observed and randomized distributions: while in weeks 9-10 
observed and randomized signals are similar at the network level, there are remarkable and 
inversed interactions between online activity and geography in the Leave and Remain subgraphs. 
	
